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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 14-3779 & 14-3780 
________________ 
 
ALBA QEMAL DINAJ, 
  
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
     ________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
(No. A047-189-009) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 24, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) seeks the removal from the 
United States of Petitioner Alba Qemal Dinaj, a native and citizen of Albania.  DHS 
alleged that Dinaj was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) as “a drug abuser or 
addict.”  A few months later the agency added that she was also removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien “who is convicted of two or more crimes involving 
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.”  The 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) agreed in part, concluding that Dinaj was removable because 
she committed two crimes of moral turpitude: theft and armed robbery.  In response, she 
applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her husband and two children would 
suffer severe hardship were she deported.  Dinaj also maintained that she committed the 
above-mentioned crimes out of desperation.   
During the hearing on her request, DHS informed the IJ that Dinaj had been less 
than forthright about her prior drug use.  It took several exchanges for Dinaj ultimately to 
admit that she suffered from a heroin addiction and was receiving treatment.  In light of 
her admission, the IJ ordered that, in addition to being removable for having committed 
multiple crimes of moral turpitude, Dinaj was removable as “a drug abuser or addict,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).  It also concluded that, notwithstanding her statutory 
eligibility for cancellation relief, she didn’t merit a favorable exercise of discretion.  Her 
criminal history and lack of truthfulness, the IJ said, outweighed the factors favoring 
cancellation—namely, Dinaj’s familial ties to the United States and her personal growth.  
J.A. 95.  Regarding the lies she told, the IJ noted that Dinaj on two occasions had denied 
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her drug use in the United States and fabricated a story to explain her prescribed use of 
Suboxone (a pain medication).   
Three days after receiving the IJ’s decision, Dinaj filed a motion to reopen (to 
introduce previously unavailable evidence) and a motion to reconsider.  The IJ denied the 
former because all of the purported new evidence was available at the time of her 
previous hearing.  It denied the motion to reconsider because Dinaj failed to persuade that 
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was flawed.  She appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) the IJ’s denial of the (1) request for cancellation of 
removal, (2) motion to reopen, and (3) motion to reconsider.  As to the cancellation of 
removal request, the BIA held that the IJ appropriately exercised its discretion in denying 
the request.  It also agreed with the IJ that Dinaj’s motion to reopen was without merit 
because the evidence she introduced was previously available and, in any event, wasn’t 
material.  The BIA came to the same conclusion regarding the motion to reconsider, 
holding that Dinaj failed to identify any legal or factual error in the IJ’s reasoning.  She 
petitions us for review, challenging the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s ruling that she was 
removable as a drug addict or drug abuser, its denial of her request for cancellation of 
removal, and its denial of her motion to reopen and motion to reconsider.  We deny the 
consolidated petitions in all respects. 
First, we find no fault with the BIA’s failure to reach whether Dinaj was 
removable for her drug issues, as she was also removable for having been twice 
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, and Dinaj makes no argument to the contrary.  
Second, we discern no factual or legal error in the IJ’s decision to deny Dinaj’s 
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cancellation application (nor the BIA’s in upholding it).  Dinaj’s argument that the IJ 
failed to consider certain favorable factors under In re Sotelo, 23 I & N Dec. 201 (BIA 
2001), is wide of the mark, as the IJ and Board identified all relevant circumstances that 
weighed in favor of cancelling removal, though both decided that the bad outweighed the 
good.  That we may have judged those factors differently is irrelevant.  See Jarbough v. 
Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Finally, we reject Dinaj’s quarrel with the 
IJ’s denial of her motion to reopen because she has failed to identify a legal or 
constitutional error regarding that decision.  
For all of these reasons, we deny the petitions for review. 
 
 
